

Madame de Motteville on Mazarin

by
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Françoise Bertaut, Madame de Motteville, was an unpretentious woman, whose greatest treasure was the good will, not to say friendship, of the queen whom she attended for almost a quarter century: Anne of Austria. Living in retirement after Anne's death, Françoise wrote memoirs. As she explained to her readers, she wanted to let posterity know the real merits, words, and actions of the late queen, and also to remember happier times and give herself, as it were, "une seconde vie."¹ Surely these were unexceptionable motives. Apparently uninvolved in political intrigues, unlike many of her memoir-writing contemporaries, and therefore presumably with no axe to grind, small wonder that Madame de Motteville has enjoyed great credibility as a historical witness. Her first editor, early in the eighteenth century, hailed her work as a useful source of information on the events of her time,² while a hundred years later the preface to the Petitot edition of her memoirs claimed that they presented "the most detailed, the most complete, the most impartial history of the first years of the reign of Louis XIV..."³ These judgments became part of French literary tradition, so that in our own time, as respected an authority as Antoine Adam has included Madame de Motteville's work in the list of sixteenth and seventeenth-century memoirs that should interest historians because of the insights they offer into the workings of politics, and into human nature.⁴ We may ask, however, how reliable these insights are and whether, in the case of Madame de Motteville for example, personal feelings and prejudices colored the picture she painted. Would a historian agree with the literary expert's evaluation of her work? Probably not. And why not? Because on closer examination it turns out that she was a far from impartial witness. The

clearest demonstration of this fact is to be found in her treatment of Cardinal Mazarin.

If Queen Anne is the heroine of Madame de Motteville's memoirs, Cardinal Mazarin figures as the villain: not a malevolent villain, it is true, but an undesirable character all the same. Madame de Motteville granted that he was very capable and had an unrivaled knowledge of foreign affairs,⁵ and that he could charm people when he wanted to.⁶ It was also to his credit that he was not cruel and

...never had a man who held so much power and was surrounded by so many enemies, been quicker to pardon or had filled prisons less than he.⁷

On the other hand she thought he deliberately used his gentle and humble manner to hide his plans and ambitions;⁸ she cast doubt on whatever virtues he exhibited and readily ascribed ulterior motives to him,⁹ she accused him of avarice and greed, of bad conduct, of ingratitude toward his patroness the queen, and of wishing to drive a wedge between her and her son so as to control the young king more completely.¹⁰ Since she did not really document such charges, Madame de Motteville was engaging in character assassination: most insiduously whenever she speculated on Mazarin's intentions. She always assumed that he had secret intentions, and that they were discreditable. Because they were secret, they could not be proved or disproved, although a suspicion is left in the reader's mind. Two instances illustrate this tactic especially well: the negotiations for the marriage of Louis XIV and Princess Marguerite of Savoy, and Louis' love affair with Mazarin's niece, Marie Mancini.

By the fall of 1658 Louis XIV was twenty years old and had just survived a serious illness. It was clearly time that he married and produced heirs to the throne. Sufficiently eligible matches however were not plentiful. As a bride for her son, Queen Anne favored the Infanta Maria Theresa, her brother Philip IV's

child, but France had been at war with Spain since 1635 and serious peace negotiations were not even in sight, while each side accused the other of wishing to prolong hostilities for territorial advantage. Of course, when peace did come, marriage would be its fitting and traditional accompaniment—unless by that time either of the parties was already contracted to another. At this juncture, the French court held out hopes to the Duke of Savoy, Charles-Emmanuel II, that Louis might make an offer for the hand of the duke's sister, Marguerite. Although it would not be as lofty a match as marriage with the Spanish infanta, it was by no means unsuitable. Whereas the infanta was Louis' cousin on his mother's side, Princess Marguerite was equally related to him through his father, being a niece of Louis XIII. Besides, there were sound diplomatic reasons for maintaining close family connections with Savoy. In November 1658 therefore, Louis XIV's aunt Christine brought Marguerite to meet him in Lyon. The French party's leisurely progress to that city however had left ample time for the Spanish king, Philip IV, to send a secret emissary to head off a French commitment to the Savoyards. Delighted with the Spanish proffer of peace talks and marriage, Louis and his mother took leave of their Savoyard relatives, with the consoling promise that he would marry Marguerite if the Spanish negotiations fell through. Whatever Marguerite or her mother and brother thought of this promise, it was a useful ploy to keep the Spaniards to the mark. Within the year peace was concluded, and in June 1660 Louis XIV married the infanta.

The standard historical interpretation of this sequence of events is that Cardinal Mazarin engineered it.¹¹ The trip to Lyon had been a gamble, undertaken in the hope that it would force the Spaniards out of their waiting game. Queen Anne played her part, making show of resignation since it seemed she could not have her Spanish niece as her daughter-in-law. None of the available evidence from Mazarin's correspondence or diplomatic papers has ever led any historian to suggest that the cardinal had goals other

than peace with Spain, with the attendant marriage between Louis and the infanta, or that he was trying to thwart the queen's wish for the Spanish daughter-in-law. Yet Madame de Motteville asserted confidently that Cardinal Mazarin was merely pretending to satisfy the queen; that he did not expect Philip IV to succumb to pressure; and that he himself favored the match with Savoy.¹² And why should he have favored Savoy? Madame de Motteville was ready with an explanation: Mazarin's niece, Olympia Mancini, was the wife of the count of Soissons, the eldest son and heir of Prince Thomas of Savoy-Carignan. Since Prince Thomas was uncle to the duke of Savoy, Charles-Emmanuel II, Olympia was a cousin by marriage of the duke and his sister. Although according to Madame de Motteville, Cardinal Mazarin had exalted notions about the establishment of his nieces,

...it seemed he was too wise to undertake to put one on the throne. The closest he could come to that was to place Princess Marguerite there, he niece's relation by marriage...¹³

Madame de Motteville's inventiveness reached similar heights when she came to Louis' love affair with another of Mazarin's nieces, Marie Mancini. Marie was in the party that went to Lyon. She and the young king were much in each other's company, and previous liking blossomed into something considerably stronger. Mazarin as well as Queen Anne thought the affair quite harmless, an innocent amusement, until Marie began to set the king against his elders. She also made fun of Louis' intended bride, the infanta, and it was noted that he did nothing to stop her. The Spanish court was aware of these complications, which would certainly not benefit the marriage negotiations if allowed to continue. The queen and Cardinal Mazarin therefore concluded that Marie must be removed from the king's proximity. Louis, hearing of this decision, pleaded passionately in her behalf, and was reported to have announced that he wanted to marry her. It availed him nothing. His mother took him in hand and appealed to his sense of honor and duty, while Cardinal

Mazarin escorted his niece to exile in the provinces. The cardinal did more than that. From the French-Spanish frontier, where he was conducting the peace negotiations, he sent letter after letter to Louis, exhorting him in unvarnished language to forget a romance that was jeopardizing the long-awaited peace treaty and therefore the well-being of his people. Indeed Mazarin chided the queen herself for permitting some correspondence between the lovers, out of pity for Louis' obvious misery.¹⁴

In the event, duty won over inclination, and Madame de Motteville had the highest praise for Cardinal Mazarin's share in this outcome.¹⁵ She had witnessed some of the scenes at court, and the queen had dropped a few words to her also. Moreover we can judge for ourselves, since Mazarin's letters have survived and have been published.¹⁶ Nevertheless Madame de Motteville took it upon herself to claim that Mazarin's original impulse had been to let the king marry his niece. As she put it, Mazarin

...was a slave to ambition, capable of ingratitude and of the natural desire to put himself first against all others.¹⁷

When his niece told him that she stood so high in the king's good graces that she might actually become queen if her uncle would help,

He did not want to deprive himself of the pleasure of testing such a fair prospect, and one day he spoke of it to the queen, ridiculing his niece's folly, but in such an ambiguous and awkward manner, that she [the queen] saw clearly enough what was in his heart, to answer him in these very words: 'I do not believe, Monsieur le Cardinal, that the king is capable of this weakness, but if it were possible that he should think of it, I warn you that all of France would rebel against you and him, that I myself would lead the revolt, and would enlist my son [Philippe?] in it.'¹⁸

Madame de Motteville was not present at this alleged exchange, nor did she say, as she did whenever possible, "Her Majesty did me the honor of telling me." The best she had to offer therefore was gossip, and a twisted interpretation of remarks perhaps overheard by a nameless informant. Madame de Motteville admitted as much a few pages further on, when she mentioned that people were saying discreetly and in secret that Mazarin would not have been averse to the king's marrying his niece, but that the queen never believed such talk.¹⁹ That did not, however, keep Madame de Motteville from treating it as fact, and moreover she was sure the cardinal carried away from the alleged interview a grudge against the queen, which

...this minister hid from everyone, but which he kept in his heart for the rest of his life, and which on a thousand occasions produced effects that no one could explain.²⁰

Madame de Motteville was fond of commenting that only the Lord could see into the hearts of men, but in the case of Cardinal Mazarin she clearly usurped the Lord's prerogative.

Why did she malign the cardinal in this way? One explanation might be resentment over benefits not received. She complained often enough that Mazarin did nothing for her, despite the queen's recommendations,²¹ and it is true that her brother lost his appointment as reader to the young king when Mazarin decided he was not a good influence. On the other hand, although Mazarin knew that Madame de Motteville neither liked him nor approved of him, she kept her place as one of the queen's ladies: unlike less fortunate people such as Madame de Hautefort. No doubt they were more outspoken than she, and more involved in actual opposition to the minister; but no doubt also that the minister was benign enough not to pursue a more or less harmless dissident.

A more sophisticated explanation for Madame de Motteville's treatment of Cardinal Mazarin has been

suggested by Georges Dethan, author of several books about the minister's career. Dethan points out that Madame de Motteville idolized Queen Anne, on whom she fixed a more than normal degree of attachment, and that she could not forgive Cardinal Mazarin for preempting so much of the queen's attention.²² This diagnosis is based on inference, from Madame de Motteville's open partisanship for Queen Anne, and from the circumstantial evidence of Madame de Motteville's presumably loveless marriage as a young girl, to an aged Norman jurist. We have however learned to read much less into feminine friendships. The component of sexual frustration and displacement need not have played such a large part in the rivalry between the lady and the cardinal. Rivalry it certainly was, at least in Madame de Motteville's eyes, for she congratulated herself whenever she managed to extract from the queen any confidence that could be interpreted as a criticism of the minister, and a distinction for herself.²³ Yet, granted that Madame de Motteville was jealous, that explains her motive for attacking the cardinal, but not the form the attack took. The picture of Mazarin that she drew, owed as much to her notions of politics and good governance as it did to her personal animosity—notions, incidentally, that permitted her to undervalue the cardinal and move the queen into the foreground.

According to Madame de Motteville, Queen Anne had good sense and sufficient powers of discernment to have kept the reins of government in her own hands during her years as regent for Louis XIV, if only she had chosen to exert herself more, and if only she had not entrusted all her power to Cardinal Mazarin:

...she distrusted herself too much, and her humility easily led her to believe herself incapable of governing the state.²⁴

This assessment of the queen seems surprising. Before her marriage she had not received any training in political skills, and after she was married, her husband, Louis XIII, kept her quite removed from any political

role. Where then could she have learned to govern after her husband died? We ask that question because in our day we see government largely, if not exclusively, in terms of administration. Administration, however, requires skills of information gathering, organization, and management. It is a job for experts rather than amateurs, and even elected officials, non-professionals, normally have at least some practical experience. That was not yet true in the seventeenth century. For Madame de Motteville, as for almost all her contemporaries, the administrative aspect of government was far overshadowed by the personal element. In theory, of course, we know perfectly well that the bureaucratic state was just beginning to establish itself, but we tend to forget that at the time people could remain unimpressed by this development.

Madame de Motteville did not expect the queen to read and digest reports from the provinces, issue instructions to officials, coordinate the movement of armies and supplies, take care of foreign affairs, or find the money to pay for it all. That was just as well, since the queen found it very hard to apply herself to memoranda of any kind.²⁵ But paperwork was unimportant to Madame de Motteville. She had in fact no idea of the amount of such work it took to govern the kingdom, and held it against Cardinal Mazarin that he was always so busy, that he kept petitioners of even the highest rank waiting in his anteroom. She thought it meant merely that he did not like to be importuned.²⁶ What then seemed to her to be the essential function of government? The distribution of patronage:

The desire and hope for graces and benefits give great strength for putting up with the tricks of enemies, the baseness of flatterers, and the cares one encounters in the cabinets of kings.²⁷

Madame de Motteville deplored the queen's readiness to entrust to Cardinal Mazarin the entire burden of dealing with requests, and she added maliciously, that

no doubt he made the queen believe that he was doing her a favor by relieving her of this burden.²⁸ In this way, she wrote, the cardinal did not leave the queen even a vestige of power, so that when she did recommend some matter to the chancellor, or the superintendent of finance, or a minister, she would be told that it must be referred to the cardinal.²⁹ Although the queen assured her that she did not care about the exercise of power,³⁰ Madame de Motteville felt that this indifference on the part of the queen was too great for a person of her rank and birth, and the power she allowed Mazarin was too absolute.³¹ And what use did he make of it?

He gave away everything that fell vacant and everything that did not belong to him. It was done indeed with the king's consent...[but] The excuse was perhaps not quite valid...³²

Mazarin was taking advantage of the young king's habituation to him

...in order to take away from him his power, his finances, and the right to dispose of offices, governments, abbeys, bishoprics, and almost generally of everything that was then in [the king's] gift.³³

In short, Mazarin controlled the royal patronage during Queen Anne's regency and even after the king came of age: and that, for Madame de Motteville, was the mainspring of government.

As it happened, it cost the cardinal considerable trouble to educate the queen out of granting indiscriminately all requests for benefices and preferments.³⁴ Madame de Motteville may have praised Anne's lack of discrimination as kindness, but it was only when Cardinal Mazarin took charge that patronage again became an instrument of royal policy, as it had been in the time of Cardinal Richelieu. Madame de Motteville interpreted this as an abuse of favor. People do not mind obeying kings, she wrote,

but they cannot abide it when kings let themselves be governed by others. Granted, monarchs need ministers to advise and serve them,

...but this confidence must be kept within strict bounds, so that [the monarchs] in using them are guided more by reason than by inclination...³⁵

Obviously it was the inclination that bothered Madame de Motteville. If the queen had not depended so completely on Cardinal Mazarin,

If he had not thought this princess needed him so much, he would have taken better care to deserve the good will of the people.³⁶

On the other hand, however, Madame de Motteville was also reflecting her contemporaries' antipathy toward minister-favorites. Some of these favorites, to be sure, had been less worthy than others. Marie de Medici's Concini, James I's and Charles I's Buckingham, or Louis XIII's Luynes had not been notable for statesmanship. Others however—Richelieu, Spain's Olivares, Mazarin himself—worked hard to secure the interests of the monarchs they served.³⁷ They were resented not only by people who suffered by their administrative innovations, or on account of the fortunes they amassed, but also because their constitutional position was so anomalous. Although in effect they were high-level administrators, they had no institutional base other than the monarch's will, and that seemed to put them on the same level as the more parasitic kind of personal royal favorite. It was no accident that the *Parlement* of Paris denounced Cardinal Mazarin as another Concini, another Italian adventurer who had exploited a regent's weakness, and who deserved a similar fate: no assassin having done the job for them, the *parlementaires* eventually put a price on Mazarin's head.³⁸ Madame de Motteville saw Mazarin in that same light, when she referred to

...the natural hatred that the people, and all good men, always have for the greatness of favorites...³⁹

Madame de Motteville thought he contributed to that hatred by his bad conduct. To the extent that she explained what she meant by bad conduct, she was echoing the allegations of the *frondeurs*:

It was said that he did not know our customs, and that he did not apply himself carefully enough to seeing them observed: [his critics] asserted that he did not concern himself as he should have, to govern the state according to the old established laws, and that he did not protect justice as he was obliged to do by his quality of first minister, and was delinquent in the care he owed the public welfare. ...under his administration the finances have been dissipated by the partisans more than in any other country. He has also ... granted ecclesiastical dignities to many persons who aspired to them from worldly motives, and has not always named men to bishoprics who would do honor to his choice by their virtue and piety.⁴⁰

What the *frondeurs* understood by old established laws, protection of justice, public welfare, was the liquidation of changes Cardinal Richelieu had introduced, such as the wider use of intendants of justice and finance; and an end to the unpopular war against the Habsburgs, begun by him and continued under Mazarin, with its attendant government borrowing and war taxation. Unlike many of the *frondeurs*, Madame de Motteville considered Richelieu a great man who had deserved well of the kingdom,⁴¹ but her animosity toward his successor blinded her to the continuities between the policies of the two men.

Similarly Madame de Motteville failed to understand, let alone appreciate, the close collaboration between Cardinal Mazarin and Queen Anne. She

became aware of it during the first months of the *Fronde*, when, it seemed to her, the queen displayed a praiseworthy vigor, while Cardinal Mazarin was much too timid and soft.⁴² At a council meeting in October 1648, the apparent conflict between the queen and the cardinal came to a head: she berated him for advising her to yield to the demands of the Paris *Parlement* and predicted that all his kindness would avail him nothing in the end.⁴³ Evidently the scene was semi-public, for Madame de Motteville heard all about it and ventured to ask the queen what Mazarin thought of his scolding, and what course she, the queen, intended to take. The queen made an ambiguous reply, with a little smile, so that the scales dropped from Madame de Motteville's eyes and she saw that the whole business was a comedy, arranged between the queen and her minister, in the hope of persuading the *frondeurs* that his hands were tied by the queen's intransigence so that concessions were out of the question.⁴⁴ In the event, Queen Anne had to grant the *Parlement* most of its demands, at least for the time being. Despite her moment of insight, Madame de Motteville continued to deplore the distribution of roles, which cast the queen as the heavy and Mazarin as the conciliator.⁴⁵

The flabbiness of his conduct at that time did not, in the end, serve him badly; but sometimes it looked so ugly, that it is impossible to praise him for it; and if he derived any advantage from it, it was thanks to divine Providence, and ... to the courageous resistance of the queen.⁴⁶

At that, Madame de Motteville did not know the half of it. Mazarin and the queen staged conflicts more than once, and notably in 1650, when the decision was taken to arrest that overmighty subject, the prince of Condé, his brother, and his brother-in-law. On that occasion the queen, in writing, ordered Mazarin to proceed with the arrests unless he wished to be thought guilty of disloyalty to the king. Why this pretense? Because in an effort to keep Condé attached to the regency government, Mazarin had promised to regard the prince as his patron, and now needed to

save face if anything went wrong with the arrest plans.⁴⁷ That Queen Anne and Mazarin worked as a team in general, can be gleaned from what little has survived of their correspondence.⁴⁸ Madame de Motteville was not familiar with that, however, nor did the queen confide in her as fully as she thought. Instead Madame de Motteville chose to distance the queen from the cardinal: in her view it was the queen who had the true spirit of a ruler, if not the energy. She saw the faults of her minister and was not his dupe; although she maintained him against all opposition, she needed him less than she thought. It was not easy for Madame de Motteville to document her interpretation. In the absence of specific information she had nothing stronger to support her than conjecture, even in the case of the events of 1658 and 1659 that she discussed in great detail because she assumed they proved her point. Here, she thought, in the rupture of the negotiations with Savoy in favor of peace and marriage with Spain, and in the resolution of the Mancini crisis, the queen's preeminent role should be made clear to everyone, although she herself disclaimed it.

She [the queen] did not like applause, and would not suffer the praises given to her for the peace and for the exile of Mademoiselle Mancini, although she alone had accomplished both the one and the other; and instead of accepting [these praises] as well deserved, she gave all the credit to the minister.⁴⁹

As we have seen, Madame de Motteville could sustain this picture of the queen only by blackening the character of Mazarin, by ascribing hidden motives to him. Psychologizing, discoursing on the weaknesses of human nature and speculating on the secret springs of conduct, was of course a favorite literary pastime in the seventeenth century. By indulging in it however, Madame de Motteville compromised her usefulness to modern historians. It is true that her veneration for Queen Anne was such, that when she reported actual words the queen had spoken to her—invariably

introduced by a phrase such as "Her Majesty did me the honor of saying"—we may trust her veracity. Indeed she probably took notes after the conversation, as we can gather from her explanation of how she collected the material for her memoirs.⁵⁰ That kind of reporting makes a valuable contribution to historical understanding, since it brings personality to life. Similarly we may rely on Madame de Motteville when she recounts events she has witnessed, such as the arrival in France of the Infanta Maria Theresa, for example, or, more sadly, Queen Anne's long-drawn-out final illness. But when she interprets events or assesses character, Madame de Motteville's memoirs become a source of a different kind: they reveal her own inclinations and prejudices. Her picture of Cardinal Mazarin therefore tells us much less about the cardinal than about herself: a woman who, despite her loyalty to the queen, was a *frondeuse* at heart.

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Notes

¹Françoise Bertaut de Motteville, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire d'Anne d'Autriche, épouse de Louis XIII, roi de France, par Madame de Motteville, une de ses favorites* (Amsterdam: François Changuion, 1723), I, preface, n.p. Hereafter cited as Motteville.

²Motteville, I, 2-3.

³Françoise Bertaut de Motteville, *Mémoires*, in *Collection des mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France*, 2^e série, éd. C. B. Petitot (Paris: Foucault, 1824); XXXVI, 306.

⁴Antoine Adam, *Histoire de la littérature française au XVII^e siècle* (Paris: Domat, 1948-1954), IV, 134.

⁵Motteville, I, 120, 429.

⁶Motteville, I, 100, 386.

⁷Motteville, I, 135. Translations of quotations are the author's own.

⁸Motteville, I, 121.

⁹For some examples, see Motteville, I, 127-128: Without being himself generous, he counseled generosity to the queen in dealing with the relatives of the late Cardinal Richelieu; or Motteville, I, 387: He seemed to have no vices.

¹⁰Motteville, I, 293, 400, 429; V, 17, 19, 24, 100, 112, 113.

¹¹Pierre Adolphe Chéruel, *Histoire de France sous le ministère de Mazarin* (Paris: Hachette, 1882), III, 199-222; Georges Dethan, *Mazarin: un homme de paix à l'âge baroque* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1981), p. 212; Ernest Lavissee, *Louis XIV, de 1643 à 1685*, in *Histoire de France depuis les origines jusqu'à la révolution française*, vol. 7, éd. Ernest Lavissee (Paris: Hachette, 1905-1907), pp. 70-72; John B. Wolf, *Louis XIV* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1968), p. 104.

¹²Motteville, IV, 398, 399; V, 6-7.

¹³Motteville, IV, 397.

¹⁴Chéruel, III, 222-246; Ruth Kleinman, *Anne of Austria, Queen of France* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1985), pp. 267-269.

¹⁵Motteville, V, 20-21.

¹⁶Jules cardinal Mazarin, *Lettres du cardinal Mazarin, où l'on voit le secret de la négociation de la paix des Pyrénées...*, nouv. éd. augmentée (Amsterdam: Henri Wetstein, 1693), pp. 14-27, 16 July 1659; pp. 27-33, 22 July 1659; pp. 179-202, 28 August 1659. See also Chéruel, III, 236-243.

¹⁷Motteville, V, 5.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹Motteville, V, 21.

²⁰Motteville, V, 5.

²¹Motteville, I, 425-426.

²²Georges Dethan, "Madame de Motteville et Mazarin, ou le complexe d'Oenone," Société d'Etude du XVII^e Siècle, *Actes et Colloques*, No. 22, "Les Valeurs chez les mémorialistes français du XVII^e siècle avant la Fronde," Colloque de Strasbourg et Metz, 18-20 mai 1978 (Paris: Klincksieck, 1979), pp. 103-110; see also Dethan, *Mazarin: un homme de paix...*, pp. 300-306.

²³Motteville, V, 19.

²⁴Motteville, I, 428.

²⁵Kleinman, pp. 233-234.

²⁶Motteville, I, 385.

²⁷Motteville, I, 135.

²⁸Motteville, I, 134.

²⁹Motteville, V, 18.

³⁰Motteville, V, 24.

³¹Motteville, V, 18.

³²Motteville, V, 109.

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴Kleinman, pp. 150-154.

³⁵Motteville, I, 295.

³⁶Motteville, I, 428.

³⁷For some recent literature on the work of minister-favorites, see Joseph Bergin, *Cardinal Richelieu: Power and the Pursuit of Wealth* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985); John H. Elliott, *Richelieu and Olivares* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); John H. Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985). For insights into some of the problems involving more traditional favorites, see Orest Ranum, "The French Ritual of Tyrannicide in the Late Sixteenth Century," *Sixteenth Century Journal*, vol. 11, No. 1 (1980), pp. 63-81.

³⁸François André Isambert, et. al., eds., *Receueil général des anciennes lois françaises depuis l'an 420 jusqu'à la révolution de 1789* (Paris: Belin, LePrieur, et. al., 1821-1833), XVII, 280.

³⁹Motteville, I, 293.

⁴⁰Motteville, I, 387-388.

⁴¹Motteville, I, 30-32.

⁴²Motteville, II, 94-98.

⁴³Motteville, II, 278.

⁴⁴Motteville, II, 279-281.

⁴⁵Motteville, II, 295.

⁴⁶Motteville, II, 398.

⁴⁷Kleinman, *Anne of Austria*, 213-214.

⁴⁸Kleinman, *Anne of Austria*, 172-173.

⁴⁹Motteville, V, 20.

⁵⁰Motteville, I, preface, n.p.